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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kevin Mingo appeals from the district court's Judgment summarily denying his 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Mr. Mingo asserts that the district court erred in 
dismissing his counsel and requiring him to represent himself at an evidentiary hearing 
without ensuring that Mr. Mingo understood the risks of proceeding pro se or that he 
was competent to proceed as his own counsel, and that such error caused or 
contributed to the denial of his petition and deprived Mr. Mingo of his right to due 
process of law. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On February 14, 2013, Kevin Mingo entered an Alford1 plea to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance. (Court's Exhibit 2, p.4.) On April 22, 2013, 
Mr. Mingo, was sentenced to seven years, with two years fixed. (R., p.11.) Mr. Mingo 
appealed from his judgment of conviction in Idaho Supreme Court case number 41083-
2013, but the direct appeal was dismissed on July 15, 2013.2 (Order Granting Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal, attached to the Motion to Augment, filed 9/25/14; 12/16/13 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.10-16.) 
On July 30, 2013, Mr. Mingo filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that 
his plea was invalid because he lacked the mental capacity to make decisions, stand 
1 Norlh Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal pursuant to the State's motion 
to dismiss as Mr. Mingo waived his right to appeal as part of the plea agreement. 
(Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal, attached to the Motion to Augment, filed 
9/25/14.) 
1 
trial, or enter into a valid plea agreement due to a motorcycle accident in 2012, and that 
his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not explain the proceedings to 
Mr. Mingo, failed to raise issues that Mr. Mingo wanted raised, and failed to file a Rule 
35 motion as Mr. Mingo had requested. (R., pp.11-17.) The district court appointed 
counsel to represent Mr. Mingo on July 31, 2013. (R., p.22.) Mr. Mingo, acting prose, 
filed an amended petition and affidavit on August 30, 2013, in which he claimed that his 
trial counsel did not properly investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
traffic stop which led to the discovery of the evidence against him, and that he should be 
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.3 (R., pp.31-36.) On September 18, 2013, the State 
filed an Answer in which it responded only to Mr. Mingo's original claims. (R., pp.40-
44.) 
On February 3, 2014, the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which 
Mr. Mingo was present. (See 2/3/14 Tr.; R., pp.73-79.) Mr. Mingo asked the district 
court to fire his attorney and to appoint a different attorney advisor to assist him at his 
hearings and to provide legal advice. (2/3/14 Tr., p.17, L.18 - p.18, L.1.) The district 
court dismissed Mr. Mingo's appointed counsel, told Mr. Mingo he was now 
representing himself and asked him if he wished to make an opening statement. 
(2/3/14 Tr., p.18, Ls.5-19.) During the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mingo acted as his own 
3 Although Mr. Mingo filed an amended petition on August 30, 2013, as noted by the 
State in its Answer filed on September 18, 2013, the district court's July 31, 2013, order 
required Mr. Mingo to file an amended petition by August 28, 2013. (R., pp.24, 31-36, 
40.) Thus, the State did not respond to the allegations contained in Mr. Mingo's 
amended petition (R., pp.40-44 ), and on appeal Mr. Mingo will focus on the allegations 
contained in his initial petition. 
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attorney, but often expressed his reservations and asked the district court for legal 
assistance on multiple occasions. (2/3/14 Tr., 18, L.20 - p.48, L.24.) 
After hearing argument and testimony, the district court took the matter under 
advisement and, on the next day, February 4, 2014, it entered an order denying 
Mr. Mingo's post-conviction petition on the grounds that, Mr. Mingo did not prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel, or any other basis for post-conviction relief. 
(R, pp.106-108.) The district court found that, where Mr. Mingo alleged in his petition 
that he was coerced into entering his plea and that he was not mentally capable of 
entering a plea, the guilty plea advisory form and the plea colloquy between Mr. Mingo 
and the district court "absolutely contradicted" those assertions and further, that neither 
of the assertions were supported by evidence at the evidentiary hearing. (R., p.107.) 
On February 4, 2014, the district court entered a final judgment. (R., pp.109-
110.) 
On February 20, 2014, Mr. Mingo filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district 
court's final Judgment and order denying his Petition. (R., pp.123-128.) 
3 
ISSUE 
the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Mingo's counsel and required Mr. Mingo 
to proceed pro se during his post-conviction evidentiary hearing, thus depriving 
Mr. Mingo of his right to due process of law?? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Mingo's Appointed Counsel And 
Required Him To Proceed Pro Se At His Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing Thus 
Depriving Mr. Mingo Of His Right To Due Process Of Law 
A. Introduction 
As a matter of first impression in Idaho, Mr. Mingo asserts that the district court 
erred in dismissing his appointed counsel and in refusing to appoint substitute counsel 
to represent Mr. Mingo, and such violated his right to due process of law. Further, the 
district court should have provided him with warnings similar to those addressed in 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), before requiring him to proceed prose at his 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where a defendant claims that his right to due process was violated, the 
reviewing court defers to the trial court's findings of fact, if supported by substantial 
evidence. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720 (Ct. App. 2001 ). However, the reviewing court freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found. Id. 
C. A Petitioner For Whom Counsel Has Been Appointed But Dismissed Should Be 
Entitled To Substitute Counsel 1 Or, At A Minimum, Should Receive Faretta-Style 
Warnings Before Being Required To Proceed Pro Se 
Where Mr. Mingo had previously made the district court aware, on multiple 
occasions, that he was experiencing difficulties with his appointed counsel, where 
Mr. Mingo had serious mental health issues such that Mr. Mingo's trial counsel had 
contemplated whether to request a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-211, 
5 
and where Mr. Mingo alternated between asking for conflict counsel, new counsel, 
advisory counsel and representing himself pro the district court was required to 
inquire further before dismissing appointed counsel and requiring Mr. Mingo to 
represent himself at his evidentiary hearing. 
As part of its promise of due process, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 
right to counsel in certain situations. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 
(1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant 
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the 
Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause."). 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "there is no Sixth Amendment 
Right to counsel in a collateral attack upon a conviction." Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 
389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014). 
However, in Idaho, the legislature has provided for the appointment of post-
conviction counsel. "A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction 
proceeding is governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings 
under the UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act], a court-appointed attorney 
'may be made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of 
representation. Idaho appellate courts have recognized a statutory right to post-
conviction counsel for non-frivolous claims as opposed to a constitutionally grounded 
right. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004 ); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 
758, 761 (Ct. App. 2006); see also I.C. § 19-852(b); I.C. § 19-4904. 
In Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner is 
entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the trial court determines that the post-
6 
conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau, 140 Idaho 792 ( quoting Brown v. 
135 Idaho (2001 )). The Court relied on Brown, a case in which that 
Court interpreted Idaho Code § 19-852(b )(3 ), a statute which set forth the standard for 
determining whether or not a post-conviction proceedings is frivolous, "[i]t is frivolous if it 
is 'not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to 
bring at his own expense."' Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (quoting Brown.) The 
Charboneau Court further held that the proceeding is not frivolous and, thus, counsel 
must be appointed, if the petitioner "alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim . 
. . . " Charboneau, at 793 (emphasis added). 
In Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007), the Supreme Court had occasion to 
revisit the standard for appointment of counsel in post-conviction cases. In that case, 
the Court reaffirmed the Charboneau and Brown standard: 
In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid 
claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain 
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims. Although "the 
petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the 
record for possible nonfrivolous claims," Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 
679, 23 P .3d 138, 141 (2001 ), the court should appoint counsel if the facts 
alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim. 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654. The Swader Court also made it clear that this standard is 
much lower than the standard for deciding petitions for post-conviction relief on their 
merits because, as had also been recognized in Charboneau, pro se petitioners 
generally cannot investigate or properly present their claims (regardless of whether 
those claims will ultimately be successful) without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 654-
55. Further, as the Idaho Supreme Court observed in Brown, 135 Idaho at 679, a pro 
se petitioner may fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for post-conviction relief 
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because he or she does not know the essential elements of the claim, and therefore the 
mere omission of an element does not necessarily justify the denial counsel. 
In this case, the district court implicitly found that Mr. Mingo's petition was not 
frivolous because it appointed counsel. Further, the district court scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing on Mr. Mingo's post-conviction petition, thereby implying that there 
was an issue of material fact such that summary dismissal would be inappropriate. 
Once the court appointed counsel, Mr. Mingo was entitled to continued 
representation by appointed counsel. The United States Supreme Court has held that 
once a state creates a right that implicates a person's liberty, the individual possessing 
this right is entitled to "those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances 
and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not 
arbitrarily abrogated." Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,557 (1974). Therefore, once 
the district court appointed counsel, that appointment was required to possess minimum 
procedures to insure that the right was not arbitrary abrogated. Among those 
procedures should have been an inquiry to determine whether dismissal was 
appropriate, whether the defendant wanted substitute counsel appointed and, if not, 
whether he was capable of proceeding pro se. Thus, it stands to reason that when 
counsel is appointed by the district court and the petitioner thereafter asks for substitute 
counsel but is denied, and then seeks to dismiss his current counsel and represent 
himself, the district court has a duty to conduct some inquiry as to whether substitute 
counsel should be appointed and whether the petitioner is capable of representing 
himself. 
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In Faretta, the United Supreme Court held that a defendant at trial has a 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to personally present a defense. Faretta, 
U.S. at 819. The Faretta Court held that before a defendant is placed in the situation of 
defending himself, he must "be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation." 422 U.S. at 835. Faretta warnings must be given "so that the record 
will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."' 
Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex. rel. Mccann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). At a 
minimum, the district court must be satisfied that the defendant understood the inherent 
risks involved in waiving his right to counsel. State v. Hunnel, 1 
(1994 ). 
Idaho 623, 626 
Although there is no constitutional right to self-representation in a post-conviction 
case such that Faretta-style warnings are constitutionally required, Faretta does 
properly identify the concerns associated with self-representation both at the criminal 
level and in collateral proceedings such as post-conviction. Faretta-style warnings 
should be given to a petitioner prior to dismissing his counsel and requiring him to 
proceed pro se. At a minimum, the petitioner should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, so that he may choose to forgo representation by 
counsel both knowingly and intelligently. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Thus, a district 
court should conduct a Faretta-style inquiry into the voluntary and intelligent nature of a 
petitioner's decision to represent himself. 
Several jurisdictions have held that a petitioner's waiver of counsel must either 
be voluntary or affirmatively made-while a formal Faretta hearing is not required, the 
post-conviction court should engage in some inquiry into the voluntary and intelligent 
9 
nature of petitioner's decision to represent himself. Jones v. 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the trial court must conduct some 
inquiry into the voluntary and intelligent nature of a petitioner's decision to represent 
himself and the petitioner "should be provided a sufficient opportunity to make a record 
of his or her reasons for seeking discharge of counsel and/or self-representation."); c.f., 
People v. Duran, 757 P.2d at 1097 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that waiver of counsel 
must be "voluntary but need not be knowing and intelligent"); Owens v. State, 578 
N.W.2d 542, 548 (N.D.1998) (recognizing that a post-conviction relief "applicant [has a] 
right to proceed pro se in a post-conviction relief proceeding if the applicant knowingly 
and intelligently elects to do so"); McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91-92 (Alaska 
197 4) (holding that a post-conviction relief applicant has a right to self-representation as 
long as: (1) the trial court determines that a prisoner is "capable of presenting his 
allegations in a rational and coherent manner"; (2) the trial court determines that the 
prisoner "understands precisely what he is giving up by declining the assistance of 
counsel"; and (3) the trial court should provide the "option of having legal counsel 
available for consultation"); Freeman v. State, 65 So.3d 553, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2011) (holding that trial court's discretion in determining whether to allow a post-
conviction defendant to proceed pro se must be informed by the facts and 
circumstances of the individual case, thus necessitating a hearing within the rubric of 
Faretta to determine whether defendant understood the implications of self-
representation ). 
Further, general policy considerations advocate in favor of requiring some sort of 
inquiry when the petitioner complains that his appointed counsel has a conflict or 
10 
communication problem with the petitioner or even in cases where appointed counsel is 
simply not getting the job done. The UPCPA provides that, generally, only one petition 
for post-conviction relief is allowed. I.C. § 19-4908. Section 19-4908 of the Idaho Code 
shows a clear preference for post-conviction petitioners to bring only one post-
conviction action. It provides that, "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under 
this [post-conviction] act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended 
application," and that, "Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or 
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief may 
[generally] the basis for a subsequent application .... " I.C. § 19-4908. 
In Idaho, a petitioner who is having difficulty reaching his appointed post-
conviction counsel or has ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel has no 
recourse in Idaho's courts in light of the recent decision by the Idaho Supreme Court, in 
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), where the Court held that the 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a prior proceeding is not a "sufficient 
reason" justifying the filing of a successive application for post-conviction relief. Id. 156 
Idaho at , 327 P.3d at 371. 
Although the grant of counsel under I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary, it still carries 
with it an implied promise of effectiveness. Regardless of whether counsel was 
appointed as a matter of right or in an exercise of the district court's discretion, the lay 
petitioner should be able to rely upon the competence of his attorney. Otherwise, the 
appointment of counsel would be but a hollow promise which would negate the statutory 
authority of the district court to appoint counsel in cases where the facts alleged raise 
11 
the possibility of a valid claim. 
1995) (holding "that the failure to 
v. Hickey, 914 P.2d 377, 379 (Colo. Ct. App. 
effective assistance of counsel is tantamount 
to not providing counsel all" in those post-conviction cases where there is a limited 
statutory right to counsel). 
Here, during the pendency of his post-conviction petition, Mr. Mingo wrote a letter 
and a memorandum to the district court asking it to allow him either to proceed pro se 
because his counsel would not accept his calls or respond to his mail, or, in the 
alternative, to appoint other counsel. (R., pp.45-49.) Mr. Mingo then filed an affidavit in 
which he asked for different, competent counsel to be appointed to represent him 
he was indigent and untrained in the law. (R., pp.51-52.) The district court 
sent Mr. Mingo a letter explaining, inter alia, that it did not intend to appoint new counsel 
to represent Mr. Mingo. (Letter, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 9/25/14.) 
Based on this letter, Mr. Mingo then filed a letter in response, in which he indicated his 
belief that in order to continue with his post-conviction case, he must proceed pro se, 
but he again asked the court to "appoint someone who would help or at least advise 
[him]." (R., pp.54-55.) Mr. Mingo also reminded the district court of his ignorance of the 
law. (R., p.55.) 
On December 16, 2013, at a status hearing to which Mr. Mingo was not 
transported or participating telephonically, Mr. Mingo's appointed post-conviction 
counsel advised the district court that he had looked into the issue of Mr. Mingo's 
competency issues, and learned from Mr. Mingo's trial counsel that his office had 
debated whether it would have been appropriate to ask the court to order a competency 
evaluation, but ultimately made the decision not to request such an evaluation. 
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(1 6/13 Tr., p.6, 3.) Post-conviction counsel also advised the district court that 
he did not intend to have mental health testify as to Mr. Mingo's capacity. 
(12/16/13 Tr., p.6, L.14 p.7, L.1.) Also at the status hearing, the district court noted 
that "Mr. Mingo has repeatedly corresponded with this Court and the clerk with regard to 
his dissatisfaction with representation." (12/16/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.8-10.) 
On February 3, 2014, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing. (2/3/14 
Tr., p.14, L.1 - p.49, L.23; R., pp.73-79.) At the outset, Mr. Mingo asked the district 
court to fire his attorney and to appoint a different attorney advisor to assist him at his 
hearings and to provide legal advice. (2/3/14 Tr., p.17, L.18 - p.18, L.1.) After which 
Mr. Mingo and the district court's conversation went as follows: 
THE COURT: So you want to fire [counsel]? 
MR. MINGO: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You want to represent yourself today? 
MR. MINGO: Yes, I do. September 22nd. 
THE COURT: [Counsel], you are excused from the case. You are 
relieved from representing Mr. Mingo. 
MR. MINGO: I'll take my file. September 22nd, to the Honorable Judge 
from Kevin Mingo, Your Honor, at this time I request -
THE COURT: Mr. Mingo, stop. I don't need to listen to all of this. You're 
representing yourself. We are here for an evidentiary hearing. Would you 
like to make your opening statement? 
(2/3/14 Tr., p.18, Ls.5-19.) Mr. Mingo represented himself at his post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing, but throughout the hearing expressed his reservations about acting 
pro se and his discomfort with the process. For example, during Mr. Mingo's opening 
statement, he said, "How my mental capability is being questioned whether I'm capable 
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standing trial or not. I don't know, especially without my meds right now, I have no 
" (2/3/14 Tr., Ls.1-4.) During the hearing, Mr. Mingo took the stand, and 
during his testimony, asked the district court, "I don't know if I'm answering this right or if 
I'm doing it right, Your Honor. I mean, seriously. Am I doing it right?" (2/3/14 Tr., p.27, 
Ls.8-10.) To which the district court responded, "[t]his is your sir. I can't advise 
you what to do." (2/3/14 Tr., p.27, Ls.11-12.) Mr. Mingo then said, "[o]kay. There's a 
reason why I was asking for an advisor on this." (2/3/14 Tr., p.27, Ls.13-14.) Mr. Mingo 
called his trial counsel to testify, and during the questioning, asked his former counsel,4 
"[s]o did you ever question - you questioned my mental capability a couple of times." 
(2/3/14 Tr., p.42, Ls.11-12.) To which his former counsel responded, "I was worried 
about it a couple times, yes." (2/3/14 Tr., p.42, L.13.) Mr. Mingo then said, "[w]ish I had 
my meds right now." (2/3/14 Tr., p.42, L.14.) In closing, Mr. Mingo asked the district 
court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, argued some of the salient facts 
surrounding the traffic stop upon which his criminal conviction was based, and said, "I 
mean, I know that. That - I might be screwing myself by doing this pro se, you 
understand?" (2/3/14 Tr., p.47, Ls.11-13.) At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Mingo 
asked the district court to appoint him an adviser: 
MR. MINGO: Okay. If I am, Your Honor, can I be allowed an adviser? 
THE COURT: An adviser? 
MR. MINGO: An adviser. 
THE COURT: Well, you told me you didn't want an attorney so I released --
4 The State subpoenaed Mr. Mingo's trial counsel to testify at the evidentiary hearing. 
(R., p.87.) 
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MR. MINGO: that I can just legal to. 
THE COURT: No. 
(2/3/14 Tr., p.48, Ls.11-19.) Where the record is replete with indications that Mr. Mingo 
made numerous requests for different legal counsel because his appointed post-
conviction attorney refused to communicate with Mr. Mingo, was not meeting his court-
ordered deadlines, and not honoring his requests to see his discovery, Mr. Mingo may 
have received ineffective assistance from his post-conviction counsel. Further 
necessitating an inquiry into Mr. Mingo's capability to represent himself on post-
conviction was the fact that Mr. Mingo's mental capacity and/or his mental health was at 
issue in the criminal case and whether he was competent to stand trial or assist in his 
own defense was never determined. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mingo even 
questioned his own capacity to understand the proceedings. (2/3/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-4.) 
Had Mr. Mingo been represented by able counsel during his post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing, the issues with his mental capacity during the entry of his guilty plea could 
have been further explored, and perhaps even bolstered by expert testimony, as 
contemplated by Mr. Mingo's counsel during the December 16, 2012 status hearing. 
(12/16/13 Tr., p.6, L.6 - p.7, L.1, p.10, L.25 - p.12, L.5.) In light of all of these 
circumstances, as well as due process right created by the appointment of counsel, the 
district court had a duty to inquire further of Mr. Mingo regarding his problems with his 
appointed counsel, before dismissing appointed counsel and requiring Mr. Mingo to 
proceed pro se at the evidentiary hearing. 
Because Idaho law provides that a district court may appoint counsel, should the 
petitioner have alleged facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim, and because there 
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is no right in Idaho to bring a successive post-conviction petition on errors or 
omissions of appointed post-conviction counsel, the importance adequate post-
conviction counsel is critical. In a situation such as this one, where Mr. Mingo 
repeatedly communicated to the district court that his counsel was not responding to his 
attempts to communicate with him, Mr. Mingo asked several times for other counsel to 
be appointed, and Mr. Mingo repeatedly expressed his reservations about self-
representation, the district court abused its discretion by not inquiring further of 
Mr. Mingo before dismissing his appointed counsel on the day of the evidentiary 
hearing, and requiring him, with no further notice or additional time to prepare to present 
his case, to go it alone at the evidentiary hearing. 
Mr. Mingo contends that, if he had not been required to represent himself at the 
evidentiary hearing without any advance notice, he would have prevailed at the 
evidentiary hearing and would have received the appropriate relief-a finding that 
Mr. Mingo was not competent to enter a guilty plea; he would thus be permitted to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
The statutory provision providing for the appointment of post-conviction counsel 
would be a hollow provision indeed, should this Court allow Mr. Mingo's complaints 
about his appointed post-conviction counsel and his attempts to obtain different counsel 
go unheeded, particularly where he will not be permitted to file a successive petition in 
which he could assert that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mingo respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and remand the case with instructions 
to hold a hearing to determine whether Mr. Mingo should be appointed substitute 
counsel for a new evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 2014. 
SALL Y1 . 6O(EY ' 
Deputy State Appellate"'Public Defender 
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